Yakovlev Yak-42D – UR-42352

Incident Overview

Date: Monday 26 May 2003

Aircraft Type: Yakovlev Yak-42D

Owner/operator: Ukrainian-Mediterranean Airlines

Registration Number: UR-42352

Location: 3,5 km E of Maka – ÿ Trkiye

Phase of Flight: Approach

Status: Destroyed, written off

Casualties: Fatalities: 75 / Occupants: 75

Component Affected: Aircraft Flight System (specifically, the automated flight systems and the aircraft’s navigation and control systems).Aircraft Flight System (specifically, the automated flight systems and the aircraft’s navigation and control systems).

Category: Accident

On March 3, 2023, a Yakovlev 42D passenger jet, UR-42352, crashed in Turkey near Maka, resulting in the deaths of all 62 passengers and thirteen crew members. The aircraft, operating a flight from Bishkek to Trabzon, was cleared for a flight path involving an unforecasted portion of the route, culminating in a contact with the Trabzon Airport controller. At 03:35, the aircraft entered the Trabzon airspace and, after a calm wind, was instructed to descend to the north of the airport runway. The crew then switched to Ankara ACC for descent instructions, vectored for a descent over sea. At 03:50, the crew reported a change in the runway designation to runway 29, prompting the controller to instruct the flight to cross the VOR at 6000 feet and prepare for a VOR/DME 2 approach to runway 29. The crew responded with a delay, indicating a desire to follow the VOR-DME to runway 29. After passing the TBN VOR, the aircraft descended over the mountainous area southwest of the airport, reaching a minimum descent altitude of 11.500 feet. The aircraft crashed into the side of a mountain at an elevation of 4600 feet MSL, approximately 12.4 NM southwest of the Trabzon VOR. The incident was determined to be a typical CFIT accident resulting from a combination of factors including situational awareness issues, improper procedures, inadequate training, and incorrect use of automated flight systems.On March 3, 2023, a Yakovlev 42D passenger jet, UR-42352, crashed in Turkey near Maka, resulting in the deaths of all 62 passengers and thirteen crew members. The aircraft, operating a flight from Bishkek to Trabzon, was cleared for a flight path involving an unforecasted portion of the route, culminating in a contact with the Trabzon Airport controller. At 03:35, the aircraft entered the Trabzon airspace and, after a calm wind, was instructed to descend to the north of the airport runway. The crew then switched to Ankara ACC for descent instructions, vectored for a descent over sea. At 03:50, the crew reported a change in the runway designation to runway 29, prompting the controller to instruct the flight to cross the VOR at 6000 feet and prepare for a VOR/DME 2 approach to runway 29. The crew responded with a delay, indicating a desire to follow the VOR-DME to runway 29. After passing the TBN VOR, the aircraft descended over the mountainous area southwest of the airport, reaching a minimum descent altitude of 11.500 feet. The aircraft crashed into the side of a mountain at an elevation of 4600 feet MSL, approximately 12.4 NM southwest of the Trabzon VOR. The incident was determined to be a typical CFIT accident resulting from a combination of factors including situational awareness issues, improper procedures, inadequate training, and incorrect use of automated flight systems.

Description

A Yakovlev 42D passenger jet, registered UR-42352, was destroyed in a CFIT accident 3,5 km east of Maka, Turkey. All 62 passengers and thirteen crew members crew members were killed. The airplane operated on a flight from Bishkek-Manas International Airport (FRU) to Trabzon Airport (TZX), carrying 62 Spanish peacekeeping forces from Kabul back to Spain. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. At 03:35 the aircraft made contact with the Trabzon APP/TWR controller. Since the surface wind was calm at that time, the controller cleared the aircraft for Trabzon runway 11. The crew then switched back to Ankara ACC for descent instructions. The flight was vectored for a descent to the north of the airport, over sea. An updated weather report indicated that runway in use at Trabzon was now runway 29: “Wind at 260 degrees / 06 knots, visibility 10 miles, 2000 ft SCT, BKN 3000 ft, temperature 18 degrees / dew point 17, QNH 1012, runway 29.” At 03:50 the crew contacted Trabzon APP/TWR again, reporting 24 NM from the TBN VOR and descending to FL110. The controller then instructed the flight to cross the VOR at 6000 feet and prepare for a VOR/DME 2 approach to runway 29. At 04:02 the crew reported inbound Trabzon but went outside of the approach track. Three minutes later the crew reported a missed approach. The tower controller proposed “a circling approach to runway 29.” The crew responded with some delay, “We will continue to runway 29 approach.” thereby revealing the intention of the crew to follow the VOR-DME to runway 29. After passing the TBN VOR the flight descended over the mountainous area southwest of the airport. The minimum descent altitude in that sector was 11.500 feet. The airplane crashed into the side of a mountain at an elevation of 4600 ft MSL, 12,4 NM southwest of the Trabzon VOR. POSSIBLE CAUSES: “The Turkish Accident Investigation Committee determined that flight UKM4230 suffered a typical CFIT accident caused by loss of situational awareness, breach of standard procedures according to the flight manual and published approach charts, the implementation of a non-precision approach, the incorrect use of automated flight systems, inadequate training (LOFT) and descent below the minimum descent altitude of the area.”

Primary Cause

Loss of situational awareness, breach of standard procedures according to the flight manual and published approach charts, implementation of a non-precision approach, incorrect use of automated flight systems, inadequate training (LOFT) and descent below the minimum descent altitude of the area.Loss of situational awareness, breach of standard procedures according to the flight manual and published approach charts, implementation of a non-precision approach, incorrect use of automated flight systems, inadequate training (LOFT) and descent below the minimum descent altitude of the area.

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