A Saab 2000 of Darwin Airline/Etihad Regional suffered a hard landing accident at Paris-CDG, France. The flight was cleared to perform an ILS approach to runway 27R. The aircraft intercepted the glide slope at 07:25. The tower controller then cleared the flight to land and reported wind from 200ø at 12 kt. The captain again advises the OPL by reminding him when to set up the aircraft for landing. At an altitude of 2,300 ft the landing configuration was set (20ø flap) and the approach target speed of 123 kt was selected. At a height of 1000 ft, the approach was stable and the runway was in sight. At a height of about 400 ft, the PF disconnected the autopilot and at 200 ft, the decision height, the crew decided to continue the approach. Passing 50 ft, the PF gradually returned the power levers to the “flight idle” position and initiated the flare. Shortly before touchdown the captain pulled on the control column to the maximum nose-up value (11ø) and the attitude reached a value of 5ø. The wheels of the main landing gear hit the ground hard, and the airplane was at an indicated speed of about 120 kt. The airplane then bounced. The copilot then pushed the control column forward, causing a nose down attitude. De PM then again pulled on the controls and the aircraft bounced a second time. The PM increased power which was immediately reduced by the PF. The nose landing gear of the aircraft then impacted the runway and collapsed. During the flare, the PIC said that the landing was going to be hard. In the emergency, he acted quickly by pulling on the controls without announcing his intentions to Copilot. This lack of coordination within the crew led to a double piloting and successive and opposite actions on the flight controls during the management of the bounced landing.A Saab 2000 of Darwin Airline/Etihad Regional suffered a hard landing accident at Paris-CDG, France. The flight was cleared to perform an ILS approach to runway 27R. The aircraft intercepted the glide slope at 07:25. The tower controller then cleared the flight to land and reported wind from 200ø at 12 kt. The captain again advises the OPL by reminding him when to set up the aircraft for landing. At an altitude of 2,300 ft the landing configuration was set (20ø flap) and the approach target speed of 123 kt was selected. At a height of 1000 ft, the approach was stable and the runway was in sight. At a height of about 400 ft, the PF disconnected the autopilot and at 200 ft, the decision height, the crew decided to continue the approach. Passing 50 ft, the PF gradually returned the power levers to the “flight idle” position and initiated the flare. Shortly before touchdown the captain pulled on the control column to the maximum nose-up value (11ø) and the attitude reached a value of 5ø. The wheels of the main landing gear hit the ground hard, and the airplane was at an indicated speed of about 120 kt. The airplane then bounced. The copilot then pushed the control column forward, causing a nose down attitude. De PM then again pulled on the controls and the aircraft bounced a second time. The PM increased power which was immediately reduced by the PF. The nose landing gear of the aircraft then impacted the runway and collapsed. During the flare, the PIC said that the landing was going to be hard. In the emergency, he acted quickly by pulling on the controls without announcing his intentions to Copilot. This lack of coordination within the crew led to a double piloting and successive and opposite actions on the flight controls during the management of the bounced landing.