The MD-83 touched down far down the runway at about 30 knots overspeed. The landing gear vibrated heavily and the plane ran off the right side of the runway, turning 145 degrees to the right. The left main gear folded into the wheel well. Fuel leaked from the wing, but there was no fire. CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT: “The accident was caused by a chain of flight crew errors in the use of the auto throttle system and ground spoilers. The touchdown occurred approximately 600 m further than normal with substantial overspeed. The immediate brake application after touchdown without ground spoiler deployment, the main landing gear vibration characteristics and the overspeed led to the main landing gear vibration and damage during the landing roll. The left main landing gear brakes were lost. Reverse was applied only 10 s after touchdown and with a low thrust setting. As a result it was not possible to stop the aircraft on the remaining runway. The aircraft turned right and sideslipped of the runway mainly because only the right main landing gear brakes were effective. Factors contributing to the accident were: 1. The 100 % high intensity approach and runway lights which possibly caused a visual illusion to captain’s height observation just before he took the controls. According to the captain‘s statement the aircraft was above the glide slope at that time. The approach and runway lights were disturbingly bright in the prevailing conditions.; 2. A change of duties between the piloting pilot and the monitoring pilot during the final phase of the final approach at a height of approximately 150 ft for which the pilots had no training nor the company established procedures.; 3. An inadvertent TOGA button push which immediately caused engine thrust to increase towards go-around thrust setting and the flight guidance system mode to change to go-around mode.; 4. The first officer did not perform the duties of the monitoring pilot after the change of duties, for example the ground spoiler operation was not monitored nor were the spoilers deployed manually. The flight guidance and auto throttle system mode changes were not observed and called out.; 5. In general, the cockpit crew co-operation during the final phase of the final approach and landing was non-existent. The company practices, procedures and training did not support the team work of the cockpit crew.”