Flight 8276 was being operated by Denim Air, under a wet-lease agreement with Air Nostrum. The Fokker took off from M laga at 11:32 for a cross-Mediterranean flight to the Spanish enclave of Melilla. The aircraft climbed to its assigned cruising altitude of FL130. After contacting Melilla tower at 11:48 the crew were told to start the descent on their own discretion and to expect a runway 33 approach. A company flight was second on approach and requested runway 15 for landing. The ATC asked the crew of PH-FZE “would you admit to use one five or do you prefer to keep on runway three three?” The question was repeated and it took some time for the crew of PH-FZE to answer: “We can accept runway one five” at 11:56. They were then cleared to runway 15 with wind 250ø and 11 kt. Four minutes later the aircraft was cleared to land with wind 240ø at 12 kt varying between 210ø and 300ø. Due to the runway change, the pilot in command had decided to land with flaps 35ø and a reference speed of 95 KIAS. The aircraft made some S-turns to lose altitude because it was a little high in the approach path. The airplane overflew the displaced threshold of runway 15 at approximately 15 ft. During the landing, the pilot in command realised that he could not engage the propeller ground idle/reverse, he said “I have no reverse” and applied brakes in an attempt to stop the aircraft. Later on, the co-pilot also applied brakes. During the landing roll the aircraft did not decelerate as expected. The wheel number 3 became locked and was deflated by a flat spot. The aircraft started to veer to the left of the runway until wheel number 1 left the runway at around 150 m before the end of the 1347 m long runway. The Fokker continued down an embankment of around 15 m in height and came to rest against the airport perimeter fence. The fuselage broke near seat rows 6 to 8, and the floor was heavily deformed between those rows. After the aircraft came to a stop, the captain had been injured, and the crew members were frozen for a while, until the flight observer pilot who was in the jump seat stated that the occupants should leave the aircraft immediately and started carrying out the on-ground emergency checklist. He pulled both fire handles and tried to close both fuel levers, but he was unable to close those levers. Then the captain turned on the evacuation lights. In the mean time, after a while and in absence of commands from the cockpit, the rear flight attendant instructed the passengers, who were all seated in the rear part of the cabin, to leave the aircraft through door 2R, which opened without problem. CAUSES: “It is considered that the accident probably happened because of a combination of three factors: 1. An unstable approach that resulted in a higher than normal touchdown speed. 2. The inability to select propeller reverse due to the probable tripping of the circuit breaker FLIGHT IDLE SOLENOID 1 & 2 before or at touchdown. 3. The cross connection of the wheel speed transducer wire harness of wheels 3 and 4, which, due to heavy braking, produced a flat spot in wheel 3 and reduced the braking capability of wheel 4.”