On August 26, 2023, Luxair Flight 9642 experienced a significant aviation incident during its flight from Berlin-Tempelhof to Luxembourg. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL90 and then to FL180, and then to a cruising altitude of FL180. At 09:52, Frankfurt control instructed the crew to descend to FL90 and inform Luxembourg Approach of their intentions. Luxembourg Approach responded with a ‘Luxair niner six four two enter Diekirch holding at flight level niner zero it will be vectors later on for an ILS approach category two on two four.’ The flight continued to FL180, and then, at 10:01, it was cleared for a further descent to 3000 feet. At 10:04:46, the controller cleared the flight to descend further to 3000 feet. The crew subsequently discontinued the approach, reporting a need for 300 meters for the approach. The pilot then stated they needed 300 metres for the approach, and the controller responded with a directive to continue the approach. The flight continued, but at 10:04:46, the captain decided to discontinue the approach, resulting in a missed approach. The co-pilot reported a ground idle stop off. Four seconds after this statement, the Tower controller reported the RVR to be 300 metres. Immediately, the engine power was reduced to idle, and the co-pilot radioed: “Nine six four two roger so we continue.” The tower then cleared the flight to land. The gear and flaps were lowered, and the aircraft descended to 10:05:17, with the left prop blade angle changing to low pitch, causing the pilot to say “Wat ass dat.” Almost immediately, the right prop blade angle also went into low pitch. The flaps were raised several sounds and exclamations were recorded by the CVR, decreasing propeller revolutions and GPWS warnings. Both engines failed, and the Fokker aircraft descended. The airplane collided with terrain and caught fire. The causes of the accident were primarily due to a lack of preparation for the landing, initiated by unnecessary occupations resulting from an obtained RVR value that was below company approved minima, leading to an uncoordinated cockpit operation. Contributing factors included violating all applicable procedures as outlined in the operations manual, including the failure to implement a go-around. Furthermore, routine procedures were violated, and the crew’s desire to arrive at its destination may have induced a psychological state, potentially leading to deviations from standard procedures. Finally, the low reliability of the secondary stop safety device, particularly the non-application of ABSC SB F050-32-4, and the operator?s internal distribution of safety information (Fokker Aircraft B.V. – Service letter137) to the crew, did not guarantee awareness of the potential loss of secondary stop on propeller pitch control. Finally, the use of training centres and non-standardised programs may have impaired the synergy of the crew.On August 26, 2023, Luxair Flight 9642 experienced a significant aviation incident during its flight from Berlin-Tempelhof to Luxembourg. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL90 and then to FL180, and then to a cruising altitude of FL180. At 09:52, Frankfurt control instructed the crew to descend to FL90 and inform Luxembourg Approach of their intentions. Luxembourg Approach responded with a ‘Luxair niner six four two enter Diekirch holding at flight level niner zero it will be vectors later on for an ILS approach category two on two four.’ The flight continued to FL180, and then, at 10:01, it was cleared for a further descent to 3000 feet. At 10:04:46, the controller cleared the flight to descend further to 3000 feet. The crew subsequently discontinued the approach, reporting a need for 300 meters for the approach. The pilot then stated they needed 300 metres for the approach, and the controller responded with a directive to continue the approach. The flight continued, but at 10:04:46, the captain decided to discontinue the approach, resulting in a missed approach. The co-pilot reported a ground idle stop off. Four seconds after this statement, the Tower controller reported the RVR to be 300 metres. Immediately, the engine power was reduced to idle, and the co-pilot radioed: “Nine six four two roger so we continue.” The tower then cleared the flight to land. The gear and flaps were lowered, and the aircraft descended to 10:05:17, with the left prop blade angle changing to low pitch, causing the pilot to say “Wat ass dat.” Almost immediately, the right prop blade angle also went into low pitch. The flaps were raised several sounds and exclamations were recorded by the CVR, decreasing propeller revolutions and GPWS warnings. Both engines failed, and the Fokker aircraft descended. The airplane collided with terrain and caught fire. The causes of the accident were primarily due to a lack of preparation for the landing, initiated by unnecessary occupations resulting from an obtained RVR value that was below company approved minima, leading to an uncoordinated cockpit operation. Contributing factors included violating all applicable procedures as outlined in the operations manual, including the failure to implement a go-around. Furthermore, routine procedures were violated, and the crew’s desire to arrive at its destination may have induced a psychological state, potentially leading to deviations from standard procedures. Finally, the low reliability of the secondary stop safety device, particularly the non-application of ABSC SB F050-32-4, and the operator?s internal distribution of safety information (Fokker Aircraft B.V. – Service letter137) to the crew, did not guarantee awareness of the potential loss of secondary stop on propeller pitch control. Finally, the use of training centres and non-standardised programs may have impaired the synergy of the crew.