Incident Overview

Date: Wednesday 25 January 1961
Aircraft Type: de Havilland DH-106 Comet 4
Owner/operator: British Overseas Airways Corporation – BOAC
Registration Number: G-APDM
Location: 67 km N of Roma-Fiumicino Airport (FCO) – ÿ Italy
Phase of Flight: Landing
Status: Substantial, repaired
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 52
Component Affected: Aircraft ? specifically nosewheel, main undercarriage, and flaps.Aircraft ? specifically nosewheel, main undercarriage, and flaps.
Category: Accident
On BOAC flight 115 from London to Rome, Khartoum, Nairobi, Salisbury and Johannesburg, the aircraft prematurely descended and performed the approach procedure, resulting in damage to the nosewheel, main undercarriage, and flaps. The aircraft struck pine trees on Monte Cimino, 40 miles North of Rome. The accident was attributed to inadequate familiarity training regarding the approach procedure, incorrect radio compass readings, and communication errors.On BOAC flight 115 from London to Rome, Khartoum, Nairobi, Salisbury and Johannesburg, the aircraft prematurely descended and performed the approach procedure, resulting in damage to the nosewheel, main undercarriage, and flaps. The aircraft struck pine trees on Monte Cimino, 40 miles North of Rome. The accident was attributed to inadequate familiarity training regarding the approach procedure, incorrect radio compass readings, and communication errors.

Description

The Comet 4 operated on BOAC flight 115 from London to Rome, Khartoum, Nairobi, Salisbury and Johannesburg. During the descent towards Rome, the aircraft prematurely descended and performed the approach procedure. After lowering the gear and beginning his approach, the aircraft hit pine trees on Monte Cimino, 40 miles North of Rome. Damage was caused to nosewheel, main undercarriage and flaps, but aircraft managed to make a successful landing at Fiumicino afterwards. The accident was attributed to the following causes: 1. Exercises for familiarization, as recommended by ICAO, with the approach procedure for Fiumicino were not carried out. These exercises were all the more necessary as it was the first time that this crew had flown to the airport. 2. The aircraft did not fly over NR and did not follow a QDR (magnetic heading) between 115ø and 122ø from NR. 3. The two radio compasses were tuned to the same frequency. As a result, only one “double” erroneous indication was available, whereas it would have been possible to have had useful indications from different sources for a “fix”, by using the bearings of pairs of radio beacons. 4. After both radio compasses had been tuned to the NF frequency, and their indications agreed with one another, they were accepted as reliable. 5. For the final navigation phase only the radio compasses were used. More importance shouId have been attached to the contemporaneous indications of the compass and clock after appreciable differences had been noted between information shown in the flight log and data which could have been obtained subsequently by observation and measurement. 6. Inaccuracy in radio communications on the part of the second pilot, (as shown in communication at 2029:30 hours). 7. The Prague transmitter interfered with radio beacon NF.

Primary Cause

Inadequate familiarity training regarding the approach procedure for Fiumicino, incorrect radio compass readings, and communication errors.Inadequate familiarity training regarding the approach procedure for Fiumicino, incorrect radio compass readings, and communication errors.

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