Incident Overview

Date: Tuesday 17 April 2018
Aircraft Type: de Havilland Canada DHC-8-402Q Dash 8
Owner/operator: Flybe
Registration Number: G-JECX
Location: Newquay-Cornwall Airport (NQY) – ÿ United Kingdom
Phase of Flight: Landing
Status: Substantial, repaired
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 60
Component Affected: Aircraft Structure (primarily aft pressure bulkhead, skin panels, frames, stringers, and tail)Aircraft Structure (primarily aft pressure bulkhead, skin panels, frames, stringers, and tail)
Investigating Agency: AAIBAAIB
Category: Accident
A DHC-8-400 aircraft experienced a tailstrike accident during landing at Newquay Airport, UK, due to a pilot’s instinctive reaction to a high sink rate. The pilot initiated a pitch increase and power increase, overriding standard procedures, leading to the aircraft’s tailstrike. The incident highlights the importance of pilot awareness and response to high sink rates near the ground, particularly in the context of a challenging weather forecast.A DHC-8-400 aircraft experienced a tailstrike accident during landing at Newquay Airport, UK, due to a pilot’s instinctive reaction to a high sink rate. The pilot initiated a pitch increase and power increase, overriding standard procedures, leading to the aircraft’s tailstrike. The incident highlights the importance of pilot awareness and response to high sink rates near the ground, particularly in the context of a challenging weather forecast.

Description

Flybe flight 353 suffered a tailstrike accident on landing at Newquay Airport, U.K. The aircraft, a DHC-8-400 departed one hour and twenty minutes late from Manchester. The forecast weather at Newquay was for overcast cloud at 400 – 500 ft with a gusty crosswind of approximately 20 kt. The co-pilot was pilot flying for the Newquay sector. The takeoff, cruise and descent were uneventful. During the cruise the commander obtained updated weather via the ATIS for Newquay, which gave landing runway 12, the surface wind 210/16 and cloud broken at 400 ft. The flight crew briefed for the approach, discussing the threat of turbulence on final and the potential for a go-around. The pilots planned to use flap 15 for the final approach because no gusts were reported on the ATIS, and to set the propeller condition levers to max in case a go-around was required. The aircraft was established on final for runway 12 at 8 nm and the co-pilot disconnected the autopilot at approximately 500 ft. At approximately 400 ft, the aircraft became displaced from the runway centreline and the co-pilot elected to go around. The goaround was uneventful and the aircraft was repositioned for a second approach. During the downwind leg the commander made a PA to reassure the passengers then briefed the co-pilot to keep the autopilot engaged until slightly later in the approach and to ensure the speed remained between the VREF and VCLIMB speed bugs. The second approach was stable until approximately 50 ft. The tower gave the surface wind as 190ø/20 kt. At approximately 50 ft the co-pilot reduced power to flight idle to control the airspeed, although neither pilot was aware that the power had been reduced this much. At approximately 30 ft above the runway, the aircraft started to sink rapidly and the commander called “power, power, power”. The co-pilot increased power and pitched up to arrest the rate of descent, but the aircraft landed firmly, striking its tail on the runway. The aircraft bounced and the commander took control. Observing the ‘TOUCHED RUNWAY’ light he elected to continue the landing. The aircraft landed and taxied to the gate without further incident. Subsequently one cabin crew member reported minor back pain. No other injuries were reported. Damage was found to several skin panels, frames, stringers and aft pressure bulkhead. Conclusion: “The tailstrike occurred because the pilot flying reacted instinctively to the high sink rate by increasing pitch attitude and power, rather than increasing power only. The aircraft manufacturer recommends that operators provide annual recurrent training in pitch awareness for flight crew to establish the correct response to high sink rate near the ground.”

Primary Cause

Pilot’s instinctive reaction to high sink rate, overriding standard procedures and failing to adequately manage the aircraft’s pitch and power.Pilot’s instinctive reaction to high sink rate, overriding standard procedures and failing to adequately manage the aircraft’s pitch and power.

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