On 28-2-1999, sustained extensive damage to left-hand propeller blades and aft fuselage structure. Further damage to nose landing gear, left-hand main landing gear and landing gear doors. No injuries reported by the 13 person on board (crew of 4 plus 9 passengers). According to the following excerpt from the official AAIB report into the accident: “Following an apparently normal ILS approach to Runway 31 at Plymouth, as the aircraft was flared for landing, it suddenly lost height. G-BRYP subsequently touched down hard on its left main undercarriage. During the landing roll, due to the damage sustained on touchdown, the left main undercarriage began to collapse but the crew were able to maintain directional control and brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway. The accident happened in daylight (11:18 hours Local time) and in VMC. Wind was 240 degrees/22 knots, gusting to 27 knots. The UK AIP (Airport Information Package) includes a warning for Plymouth City Airport, which states that ‘in strong wind conditions, wind shear and turbulence may be experienced…’ Evidence from the aircraft’s FDR indicated that the aircraft encountered wind shear as it entered the landing flare. The co-pilot was handling the aircraft for the landing. The Company Flying Manual Standard Operating Procedures, as amended, sets limits for when co-pilots can act as handling pilot for landings. In part, these give a maximum wind speed of 15 knots, including gusts and a crosswind limit of ’20 knots, less than the captain’s’, in this case 15 knots. However, it was also stated that ‘captains may use their discretion in setting higher for First Officers if they consider conditions merit it.’ The co-pilot considered this statement ‘misleading’ in relation to the limits. The company restrictions had been introduced because of the experience levels of their co-pilots and the difficulties of landing at airfields such as Plymouth. The AAIB considers that the timing of the windshear was such that prompt and correct action would be required to recover the situation and that a ‘more experienced pilot should have been able to cope with the conditions.’ The crew had conducted the approach in a professional manner, and they were aware of the surface wind conditions. However, the captain was concerned about the approach. He had asked the co-pilot if he was happy to continue but seemed reluctant to take control unless the co-pilot asked him to. ‘By not taking a positive decision when he first realised the actual wind conditions and taking control…, the (captain) allowed the situation to develop into one where the co-pilot landed (the aircraft) in conditions outside his experience or authorisation.'”