Incident Overview

Date: Sunday 28 February 1999
Aircraft Type: de Havilland Canada DHC-8-311
Owner/operator: Brymon Airways/British Airways CityExpress
Registration Number: G-BRYP
Location: Plymouth City Airport, Roborough, Plymouth, Devon – ÿ United Kingdom
Phase of Flight: Landing
Status: Substantial
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 13
Component Affected: Left-hand propeller blades, aft fuselage structure, left-hand main landing gear, left-hand main landing gear, landing gear doors, and the aircraft’s FDR.Left-hand propeller blades, aft fuselage structure, left-hand main landing gear, left-hand main landing gear, landing gear doors, and the aircraft’s FDR.
Investigating Agency: AAIBAAIB
Category: Accident
On 28-2-1999, a serious accident occurred at Plymouth Airport following a sudden loss of height during an ILS approach to Runway 31. The aircraft sustained significant damage to its left-hand propeller blades and aft fuselage structure. The landing roll resulted in damage to the nose landing gear, left-hand main landing gear, and landing gear doors. The crew reported no injuries, but the aircraft experienced severe turbulence, including wind shear, as it entered the landing flare. The incident was observed in daylight (11:18 hours Local time) with a wind speed of 240 degrees/22 knots, gusting to 27 knots. The UK AIP issued a warning regarding strong winds and turbulence, and the aircraft?s FDR indicated wind shear during entry. The co-pilot was handling the aircraft for the landing, and the company Flying Manual Standard Operating Procedures (FMSOPs) stipulated limits for co-pilot actions, particularly regarding wind speed. The Captain expressed concern about the approach, prompting the co-pilot to hesitate before taking control. The co-pilot’s reluctance to take decisive action contributed to the situation, leading to the aircraft landing in conditions outside its experience and authorization.On 28-2-1999, a serious accident occurred at Plymouth Airport following a sudden loss of height during an ILS approach to Runway 31. The aircraft sustained significant damage to its left-hand propeller blades and aft fuselage structure. The landing roll resulted in damage to the nose landing gear, left-hand main landing gear, and landing gear doors. The crew reported no injuries, but the aircraft experienced severe turbulence, including wind shear, as it entered the landing flare. The incident was observed in daylight (11:18 hours Local time) with a wind speed of 240 degrees/22 knots, gusting to 27 knots. The UK AIP issued a warning regarding strong winds and turbulence, and the aircraft?s FDR indicated wind shear during entry. The co-pilot was handling the aircraft for the landing, and the company Flying Manual Standard Operating Procedures (FMSOPs) stipulated limits for co-pilot actions, particularly regarding wind speed. The Captain expressed concern about the approach, prompting the co-pilot to hesitate before taking control. The co-pilot’s reluctance to take decisive action contributed to the situation, leading to the aircraft landing in conditions outside its experience and authorization.

Description

On 28-2-1999, sustained extensive damage to left-hand propeller blades and aft fuselage structure. Further damage to nose landing gear, left-hand main landing gear and landing gear doors. No injuries reported by the 13 person on board (crew of 4 plus 9 passengers). According to the following excerpt from the official AAIB report into the accident: “Following an apparently normal ILS approach to Runway 31 at Plymouth, as the aircraft was flared for landing, it suddenly lost height. G-BRYP subsequently touched down hard on its left main undercarriage. During the landing roll, due to the damage sustained on touchdown, the left main undercarriage began to collapse but the crew were able to maintain directional control and brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway. The accident happened in daylight (11:18 hours Local time) and in VMC. Wind was 240 degrees/22 knots, gusting to 27 knots. The UK AIP (Airport Information Package) includes a warning for Plymouth City Airport, which states that ‘in strong wind conditions, wind shear and turbulence may be experienced…’ Evidence from the aircraft’s FDR indicated that the aircraft encountered wind shear as it entered the landing flare. The co-pilot was handling the aircraft for the landing. The Company Flying Manual Standard Operating Procedures, as amended, sets limits for when co-pilots can act as handling pilot for landings. In part, these give a maximum wind speed of 15 knots, including gusts and a crosswind limit of ’20 knots, less than the captain’s’, in this case 15 knots. However, it was also stated that ‘captains may use their discretion in setting higher for First Officers if they consider conditions merit it.’ The co-pilot considered this statement ‘misleading’ in relation to the limits. The company restrictions had been introduced because of the experience levels of their co-pilots and the difficulties of landing at airfields such as Plymouth. The AAIB considers that the timing of the windshear was such that prompt and correct action would be required to recover the situation and that a ‘more experienced pilot should have been able to cope with the conditions.’ The crew had conducted the approach in a professional manner, and they were aware of the surface wind conditions. However, the captain was concerned about the approach. He had asked the co-pilot if he was happy to continue but seemed reluctant to take control unless the co-pilot asked him to. ‘By not taking a positive decision when he first realised the actual wind conditions and taking control…, the (captain) allowed the situation to develop into one where the co-pilot landed (the aircraft) in conditions outside his experience or authorisation.'”

Source of Information

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f01440f0b6134200028b/dft_avsafety_pdf_501419.pdf, https://siteapps.caa.co.uk/g-info/rk=BRYP, http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-dh8-315.htm, https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/De-Havilland-Canada/DHC-8_Dash-8/315/C-FJFW-Avmax-Group, https://www.flickr.com/photos/gary_morris/16202549454/in/photolist-qiFztA-rQZzJS-qFLisW-qrcWQY-4nFhz1-6h3NZ1-9p3a5T-bps5g6-84VaJu-zYDRMa-q3e7Rqhttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f01440f0b6134200028b/dft_avsafety_pdf_501419.pdf, https://siteapps.caa.co.uk/g-info/rk=BRYP, http://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-dh8-315.htm, https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/De-Havilland-Canada/DHC-8_Dash-8/315/C-FJFW-Avmax-Group, https://www.flickr.com/photos/gary_morris/16202549454/in/photolist-qiFztA-rQZzJS-qFLisW-qrcWQY-4nFhz1-6h3NZ1-9p3a5T-bps5g6-84VaJu-zYDRMa-q3e7Rq

Primary Cause

Wind shear during the ILS approach was the primary cause of the accident. The aircraft’s response to the wind shear, including the co-pilot’s hesitation, was a critical factor in the accident’s severity.Wind shear during the ILS approach was the primary cause of the accident. The aircraft’s response to the wind shear, including the co-pilot’s hesitation, was a critical factor in the accident’s severity.

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