Incident Overview

Date: Thursday 14 June 2001
Aircraft Type: de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103
Owner/operator: Wider?es Flyveselskap
Registration Number: LN-WIS
Location: B†tsfjord Airport (BJF) – ÿ Norway
Phase of Flight: Landing
Status: Destroyed, written off
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 27
Component Affected: The primary component affected is the right-hand main gear of the aircraft, which collapsed during landing due to structural damage.The primary component affected is the right-hand main gear of the aircraft, which collapsed during landing due to structural damage.
Investigating Agency: HSLBHSLB
Category: Accident
A DHC-6 Twin Otter, registration WF954, experienced a catastrophic accident on B†tsfjord Airport on August 26, 2001. The aircraft was involved in a hard landing on the right-hand main gear, resulting in significant structural damage. The flight was conducted by the co-pilot, who lost sight of the runway and subsequently took over control. The aircraft was subsequently shipped to Bod?, where it was recovered and broken up. The incident was attributed to several factors, including a deviation from standard operating procedures, inadequate CRM usage, and a failure to properly assess the situation. The pilot’s experience and the aircraft’s configuration contributed to the accident.A DHC-6 Twin Otter, registration WF954, experienced a catastrophic accident on B†tsfjord Airport on August 26, 2001. The aircraft was involved in a hard landing on the right-hand main gear, resulting in significant structural damage. The flight was conducted by the co-pilot, who lost sight of the runway and subsequently took over control. The aircraft was subsequently shipped to Bod?, where it was recovered and broken up. The incident was attributed to several factors, including a deviation from standard operating procedures, inadequate CRM usage, and a failure to properly assess the situation. The pilot’s experience and the aircraft’s configuration contributed to the accident.

Description

Wider?e flight WF954 departed Alta at 15:22 for a flight to B†tsfjord. The Localizer/DME approach to runway 21 at B†tsfjord was flown by the co-pilot. After passing the missed approach point the captain took over control because they lost sight of the runway. The approach was continued but the airplane touched down hard on the right hand main gear, which collapsed. The aircraft was shipped to Bod? August 26, 2001 and broken up. CONCLUSION (Translation from Norwegian): 1 The aircraft was in airworthy condition before landing, 2 The Aircraft Mass & balance was within limits, 3 The Crew was qualified for the flight in question, 4 The Commander had several years of experience on the Norwegian STOL Airport System with DHC-6/300 Twin Otter, and had a total of more than 20.000 hours, but only 320 hours on the Bombardier Dash-8/100, 5 The 1st Officer had approximately 1000 hours on the Dash-8, 6 The Crew deviated from the prescribed procedure, 7 The Crew deviated from the company Standard Operating Procedure – SOP, 8 The Crew’s use of CRM did not function as described in the company Flight Operations Manual – FOM, 9 The Crew departed minimum altitude without adequate visual reference, 10 The Crew did not consider “go around” when passing Decision Point without adequate, visual references to the runway 11 The Crew did not consider “go around” during a landing with apparent flight control problems, 12 The Crew completed the landing despite the fact that the aircraft was not in a stabilised configuration, 13 The non-stabilised landing with a high descent rate overloaded the right undercarriage fuse pin to a point at which it collapsed, 14 The Aircraft received considerable, structural damage during the accident, 15 None of the occupants was injured during the accident, 16 The Public Address System did not function when used by the Commander for evacuation, 17 The Cabin Attendant carried out her duties in an exemplary fashion 18 The Airport Fire- & Rescue Service carried out their duties in an exemplary fashion.

Primary Cause

Deviation from Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and CRM (Crew Resource Management) practices, particularly regarding runway visual reference, go-around procedures, and critical decision-making.Deviation from Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and CRM (Crew Resource Management) practices, particularly regarding runway visual reference, go-around procedures, and critical decision-making.

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