Incident Overview

Date: Saturday 26 September 1998
Aircraft Type: Cessna 560 Citation Ultra
Owner/operator: Gamston Aviation Ltd.
Registration Number: VP-CKM
Location: Fairoaks Airport – ÿ United Kingdom
Phase of Flight: Landing
Status: Substantial, repaired
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3
Component Affected: Aircraft – Specifically, the left wing tip, fuselage, and engine damage, with a focus on the left engine and the aircraft’s landing gear.Aircraft – Specifically, the left wing tip, fuselage, and engine damage, with a focus on the left engine and the aircraft’s landing gear.
Investigating Agency: AAIBAAIB
Category: Accident
A flight from Sheffield to Fairoaks, involving a planned landing at Runway 06, was significantly impacted by adverse weather conditions and a critical error in communication and decision-making. The crew, piloting VP-CKM, initially approached the airfield with a non-directional radio beacon and a track to Runway 06, but experienced a shift in priorities due to the AFISO’s warning about a fire cover unavailable. The commander, relying on the Fairoaks NDB and Flight Management System, initiated an approach to Runway 24, despite visibility limitations and the presence of a tailwind. A critical misjudgment regarding the runway’s visibility led to a series of events culminating in significant damage to the aircraft. The crew’s actions, including deploying speedbrakes, selecting thrust reverser, and attempting to close the engines, exacerbated the situation. The subsequent landing run resulted in a substantial impact, with the co-pilot’s actions contributing to the damage. The AFS’s response, including the immediate evacuation and assessment of the scene, was crucial to mitigating the risks. The incident highlights a failure to adequately consider weather conditions and the potential consequences of a miscommunication.A flight from Sheffield to Fairoaks, involving a planned landing at Runway 06, was significantly impacted by adverse weather conditions and a critical error in communication and decision-making. The crew, piloting VP-CKM, initially approached the airfield with a non-directional radio beacon and a track to Runway 06, but experienced a shift in priorities due to the AFISO’s warning about a fire cover unavailable. The commander, relying on the Fairoaks NDB and Flight Management System, initiated an approach to Runway 24, despite visibility limitations and the presence of a tailwind. A critical misjudgment regarding the runway’s visibility led to a series of events culminating in significant damage to the aircraft. The crew’s actions, including deploying speedbrakes, selecting thrust reverser, and attempting to close the engines, exacerbated the situation. The subsequent landing run resulted in a substantial impact, with the co-pilot’s actions contributing to the damage. The AFS’s response, including the immediate evacuation and assessment of the scene, was crucial to mitigating the risks. The incident highlights a failure to adequately consider weather conditions and the potential consequences of a miscommunication.

Description

The crew left Sheffield in VP-CKM at 06:22 hrs for their flight planned destination of Fairoaks with London Heathrow Airport as an alternate. By 06:50 hrs they were in contact with the Aerodrome Flight Information Service Officer (AFISO) at Fairoaks but the AFISO advised the crew not to land until the normal operating time at 07:00 hrs when the airfield would have fire cover available. The current weather was reported to the crew by the AFISO as follows: Sky clear; mist with a visibility of 1,200 metres; surface wind 060ø less than 5 kt; QNH 1002 mb and QFE 1005 mb. The commander, who was the handling pilot, approached the airfield on a track of 060ø using the Fairoaks Non-directional Radio Beacon (NDB) and the aircraft’s Flight Management System (FMS), and descended to 1,000 feet agl with the intention of landing on runway 06. However, neither pilot saw the airfield until they were overhead and, in agreement with the AFISO, decided to make an approach to runway 24 because of better visibility in that direction. The AFISO switched on the Abbreviated Precision Approach Path Indicators (APAPIs) for runway 24 and the commander flew a tear drop pattern to the east of the airfield and then established the aircraft on a track of 240ø towards the airfield. During the pattern, the gear had been selected down and the flaps set to an intermediate position. At 1.8 nm DME range, the co-pilot saw the APAPIs slightly left of the aircraft nose and pointed them out to the commander; at the time, the co-pilot recalled that the APAPIs were showing ‘two whites’, the aircraft was at 1,000 feet agl and at 124 kt IAS. By now, the crew had been advised to land at their discretion with the wind calm. Subsequently, full flap was selected and the commander noted his speed on short finals as 104 kt. As VP-CKM approached the threshold, the commander called for the deployment of speedbrakes; as the co-pilot deployed the speedbrakes, he noted the DME range as 0.5 nm and that the FMS indicated a tailwind of 5 kt. The commander considered that touchdown was positive and just beyond the threshold; the co-pilot considered that touchdown was just past the APAPIs. Immediately after touchdown, the commander selected full thrust reverse on both engines and applied moderate wheel braking. Initially, he considered that the retardation seemed adequate but then seemed to reduce. The co-pilot was not aware of retardation and remembered applying maximum brake pedal pressure while noticing that the runway was damp and seemed “shiny”. When he realised that he could not stop the aircraft before the end of the runway, the commander stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to close down the engines. During the later part of the landing run, the co-pilot heard a call of “going round” and saw the commander stow the thrust reversers. After leaving the runway, the aircraft travelled for 250 metres before coming to rest. The passenger evacuated through the cabin escape hatch and the co-pilot followed him after an unsuccessful attempt to open the normal cabin door. The co-pilot was then able to open the cabin door from the outside and assist the commander to leave. The commander had sustained back injuries and the copilot had received some cuts and bruises. On seeing the aircraft going off the runway, the AFISO alerted the AFS who, because of the misty conditions, had positioned at the threshold of runway 24. The AFS followed the track of VP-CKM and on arrival at the crash scene, where there was a strong smell of fuel with smoke emanating from the engines, covered the aircraft with foam. The AFS moved the aircraft occupants well clear of the wreckage and remained on the scene. Prior to departure, the commander checked the landing distance required for the expected weight of VP-CKM at Fairoaks and calculated that he had 30 to 40 metres longer than required based on zero surface wind. This calculation was subsequently confirmed as reasonable for a landing on runway 24. However, at the time of landing there was a slight tailwind and the runway was not dry. The aircraft had sustained serious damage. The landing gear was torn off, the left wing tip removed, and extensive impact damage to fuselage underside, wings and tail. There was heavy FOD ingestion damage to the right engine. The wreck was sold 5 February 1999 to Dodson International Parts Inc & to Ultra Acquisitions Ltd and rebuilt as N561JS.

Primary Cause

Miscommunication and failure to adequately assess and respond to weather conditions, leading to a critical error in runway visibility and subsequent decision-making.Miscommunication and failure to adequately assess and respond to weather conditions, leading to a critical error in runway visibility and subsequent decision-making.

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