Binter flight 8261 left Melilla 37 minutes late, at 9:37, for a flight to M laga. The climb and cruise were uneventful and at 10:03 the co-pilot contacted Malaga Approach. The flight was cleared for a runway 32 ILS approach. After switching from the Approach to the Tower radio frequency, a no. 1 engine fire warning was noted by the crew. The co-pilot advised Malaga Tower of the emergency “estamos en corta final, llevamos fuego en un motor, declaramos emergencia”. The co-pilot followed the emergency procedures, during which both engines were switched off. The plane descended and collided with the post of the first approach lights, 538 meters short of the runway threshold. It slid 220 meters, during which it hit five approach light stanchion and finally hit the embankment of the N-340 motorway. Following the crash, some passengers remained trapped in the aircraft for 10 minutes until its rear door could be opened. CAUSES (translated from Spanish report): “It is considered that the cause of the accident was the incorrect execution, by the crew, of the emergency procedure of fire or serious damage in an engine contained in the Flight Operations Manual that was on board the aircraft, causing the consecutive stop of the two engines of the aircraft, with the consequent total loss of thrust, so that the progression of the flight was prevented. The activation of the emergency procedure occurred as a result of a fire warning in the left engine that turned out to be false. The appearance of the false fire warning may have been caused by the presence of moisture and/or dirt on the connectors of the fire detector circuit. It is considered that a contributing factor to these circumstances could have been the definition of maintenance tasks for this system in the aircraft Maintenance Manual, which did not conform to the methods recommended by the designer-manufacturer of the fire detection system in relation to avoiding the existence of humidity in the installation. As factors that could have contributed to crew malfunction during the application of the emergency procedure, the following are considered: – A lack of coordination in the piloting tasks, carried out in the absence of “Cabin Resource Management” criteria. – Insufficient training for the change of pilot station received by the co-pilot, which did not include training in simulator of application of emergency procedures”.