The CRJ-100SE, a corporate version of the RegionalJet, was conducting a maintenance positioning flight from Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport to Berlin-Sch”nefeld Airport (SXF), Germany. At 14:30 hours the aircraft was rolled out of a heated hangar and towed to the apron of the Vnukovo-3 business terminal. At 15:57 the crew radioed a request to start the engines. This was allowed by ATC and the crew read back: “CK, start up approved and we will be ready in 10 to 15 minutes for taxi and take off due to deicing procedure”. At 16:01 the aircraft was towed to the anti-icing platform, where, at the request of the captain, it was processed in two stages by type I and type IV fluids. At 16:18 after the anti-icing treatment of the aircraft was completed, it was towed to the beginning of taxiway 14, where the engines were started. After working the necessary checklists the flight was cleared to taxi to runway 06 for departure. At 16:36 the flight was cleared for takeoff. The airplane lifted off runway 06 about 1,500 meters from the threshold, and immediately banked sharply to the left. It then banked sharply to the right, hitting the runway with the right wingtip. The airplane continued to roll to the right until it was inverted, and veered off the right side of the runway. It came to rest 1,950 meters from the runway threshold, about 35 meters to the right of the runway’s edge. PROBABLE CAUSE (translated from Russian): The accident with the aircraft CRJ100-SE registration number N168CK occurred as a result of loss of the lifting properties of the wing during the take-off phase, which led to the stalling of the aircraft immediately after detachment from the runway, collision of the right wing tip with the surface of the runway, subsequent destruction and fire. The reason for the loss of the bearing properties of the wing under the actual meteorological conditions (moderate to strong rainfall, temperature minus 6øC, dew point minus 7øC) was the effect of ground icing, despite the anti-icing treatment that could be caused by a combination of the following factors: – deficiencies in the guidance documents defining the procedure for de-icing aircraft in a two-stage procedure, which resulted in the possibility of a different interpretation of the requirements for the start of a 3-minute interval between the first and second stages of processing; – non-receipt by the crew of meteorological documentation in full in preparation for the flight and, as a consequence, inability to correctly determine the protective action time of the LOA and failure to take measures to re-process the aircraft; – violation of the airway route recommended by the AFM, and non-retention of the recommended 3-minute interval between the first and second stages of treatment; – lack of proper control by crew members and / or airline representatives for the completeness and quality of anti-icing treatment; – non-inclusion by the crew of the PIC wing before take-off, which is a mandatory requirement of the AFM for the actual weather conditions. The protuberance of the sealant on the upper and lower surfaces of the wing by an amount significantly exceeding the limitation of the current technical conditions, as well as the beginning of the nose wheel lift of the aircraft at a speed of 12 knots less than the recommended one, reduced the margin for the stall angle of attack. The existing procedural method for monitoring the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency at the take-off stage of the existing stall protection system, because of the increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of such incidents in the future.