Atlantic Airways flight 670, a BAe-146-200, went down a rocky slope following a runway excursion after landing at Stord Airport, Norway, killing 4 occupants; 12 survived the accident. Atlantic Airways Flight RC670 was chartered by the Norwegian industrial concern Aker Kv‘rner to fly personnel from Stavanger (SVG) to Molde (MOL) via Stord (SRP). The airplane departed Stavanger at 07:17 and positioned for an approach to runway 33 at Stord around 07:30. Before OY-CRG started its approach, the airport performed a routine runway inspection. The runway report did not contain information with regard to whether the runway was dry, damp or wet. Because the crew were not informed otherwise, they assumed that the runway was dry. However, investigations by the AIBN have revealed that the runway was in fact damp. A corresponding aircraft had performed a normal landing towards the south (runway 15) 15 minutes earlier. The crew of OY-CRG were given a wind reading of 120ø at 6 knots. They had visual contact with the airport at an early stage and decided to carry out a visual approach northwards (runway 33). Upon landing the pilots noted that the aircraft’s lift spoilers did not deploy. The indicator lights that normally light up after 3 seconds did not do so. The pilots immediately called “No spoilers”. Thereafter the pilots experienced that the maximum application of the brakes did not lead to the expected deceleration. The alternative braking system was brought into use and then finally the emergency brakes, without this making any difference. The emergency brakes do not have anti-skid protection and the wheels locked, so that in combination with the damp runway reverted rubber hydroplaning occurred. Consequently the friction against the runway was significantly reduced. The commander had a certain directional control of the aircraft and wanted to avoid leaving the runway at places where he knew that the terrain was particularly unfavourable. The aircraft left the runway end to the north at a relatively low speed of 15-20 knots. It continued down a steep slope and the aircraft sustained significant damage as it crashed into lighting poles, trees and large rocks. When the aircraft came to rest, it was not possible to stop the left inner engine (no. 2) due to the damage. It continued to operate at a high rpm for several minutes. The forward left emergency exit could not be opened due to damage to the fuselage that had jammed the door. The forward right emergency exit was blocked by the terrain outside. The commander made several attempts to open and release the cockpit door without success. The cabin roof had sustained a large rift which resulted in fuel from the wings entering the cabin. A fire on the aircraft’s right side spread into the cabin and over to the aircraft’s left side. Three passengers and the forward cabin crew member were killed. The remaining nine passengers and the rear cabin crew member managed to evacuate the aircraft from the aircraft’s rear left emergency exit by jumping to the ground and passing the engine that was still running. Six people sustained serious burns. According to the manufacturer’s approved documentation, it is to be expected that the landing distance would increase by 40% if all lift spoilers were inoperative. The AIBN has calculated that under the prevailing conditions OY-CRG should have stopped around 100 metres before the end of the runway. The aircraft’s undercarriage has been thoroughly examined by the AIBN. A number of fragments of “boiled” rubber were found on the runway. Further, a tyre showed clear indications of so-called “rubber reversal” which occurs when a cushion of steam forms and the rubber is “boiled” under the tyres. The investigation report did not contain a probable cause paragraph as recommended in ICAO Annex 13. It was amongst others concluded that none of the aircraft’s six lift spoilers were deployed when the commander operated the spoiler lever. The AIBN has found two possible explanations for the spoilers not being deployed: 1. A mechanical fault in the spoiler lever mechanism. 2. Faults in two of the four thrust lever micro switches. A fault in one switch may have been hidden right up until a further switch failed. The AIBN reports that the runway at Stord was not grooved and it believes that reverted rubber hydroplaning will not occur, or will be significantly reduced, on grooved runways.