Global 5000 C-GXPR departed Hamilton (YHM) at 11:53 EST on a flight to the Fox Harbour private airstrip. During the landing the aircraft touched down about seven feet short of the runway, impacting the runway edge or lip, causing significant gear damage and subsequent collapse. The aircraft slid on its fuselage and right wing departing the right side of the runway surface. After crossing several low earthen berms it came to a stop approximately 1000 feet from the runway threshold. FINDINGS AS TO CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1. The crew planned a touchdown point within the first 500 feet of the runway to maximize the available roll-out. This required crossing the threshold at a height lower than the manufacturer’s recommended threshold crossing height (TCH). 2. The flight crew members flew the approach profile as they had done in the past on the smaller Bombardier Challenger 604 (CL604), with no consideration for the Global 5000 greater aircraft eye-to-wheel height (EWH), resulting in a reduced TCH. 3. The abbreviated precision approach path indicator (APAPI) guidance, although not appropriate for this aircraft type, would have assured a reduced main landing gear clearance of eight feet above threshold. At 0.5 nm, the pilot flying (PF) descended below the APAPI guidance, further reducing the TCH. 4. The pilot used the wing-low crosswind technique, increasing his workload and resulting in pilot-induced oscillations. 5. Both pilots’ low experience on the Global 5000, combined with the PF’s high workload, affected their ability to recognize the unsafe approach path and take appropriate corrective action. 6. With the aircraft in a low energy state, the pitch up to 10.6§ without an associated thrust increase could not correct the flight profile, resulting in the impact with the sloped surface before the runway threshold. 7. The impact with the sloped surface initiated a sequence resulting in the collapse of the right main gear, a loss of directional control, the eventual departure from the runway surface, substantial damage to the aircraft, and some injuries. 8. Contrary to the manufacturer’s recommended practices, Jetport’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) sanctioned descent under electronic or visual glide slope guidance, with a view to extending the landing distance available as acceptable and good airmanship; this contributed to the aircraft landing short of the runway. 9. The lack of an effective transition from traditional safety management to a functional safety management system (SMS) as required by Jetport’s private operator certificate (POC) prevented an adequate risk assessment of the introduction of the Global 5000 into its operations and contributed to the accident. 10. An inappropriate balance of responsibilities for oversight between the regulator, its delegated agency, and the operator resulted in Jetport’s inadequate risk assessment not being identified.