Incident Overview

Date: Saturday 27 November 2010
Aircraft Type: Airbus A340-313X
Owner/operator: Finnair
Registration Number: OH-LQD
Location: Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH) – ÿ Hong Kong
Phase of Flight: Take off
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 272
Component Affected: Aircraft Control System (specifically, the aircraft’s guidance system and taxiing capabilities).Aircraft Control System (specifically, the aircraft’s guidance system and taxiing capabilities).
Investigating Agency: CAD Hong KongCAD Hong Kong
Category: Accident
During taxiing on Taxiway B westbound, an aircraft deviated from established procedures after a premature right turn onto Taxiway A. This resulted in a momentary degradation of situational awareness and a subsequent stop of taxiing.During taxiing on Taxiway B westbound, an aircraft deviated from established procedures after a premature right turn onto Taxiway A. This resulted in a momentary degradation of situational awareness and a subsequent stop of taxiing.

Description

The incident occurred at night time during which FIN070 was cleared by ATC to taxi on Taxiway B westbound for departure on Runway 07L. When the aircraft was approaching the western end of Taxiway B, ATC cleared the aircraft for take-off on Runway 07L. The aircraft took the normal right turn at the end of Taxiway B towards Runway 07L but then took a premature right turn onto Taxiway A, a taxiway parallel to and in between the runway-in-use and Taxiway B. With the help of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) provided in the Control Tower, ATC observed that the aircraft commenced take-off roll on Taxiway A. On detecting the anomaly, ATC immediately instructed the pilot to stop rolling and the aircraft was stopped abeam Taxiway A5, approximately 1400 metres from the beginning (western end) of Taxiway A. The following causal factors were identified: 1 A combination of sudden surge in cockpit workload and the difficulties experienced by both the Captain and the First Officer in stowing the EFB computers at a critical point of taxiing shortly before take-off had distracted their attention from the external environment that resulted in a momentary degradation of situation awareness. 2 The SOP did not provide a sufficiently robust process for the verification of the departure runway before commencement of the take-off roll. 3 The safety defence of having the First Officer and the Relief Pilot to support and monitor the Captain?s taxiing was not sufficiently effective as the Captain was the only person in the cockpit trained for ground taxi.

Source of Information

http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/Etusivu/1290609240897, http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/B-LAT1-2011.pdfhttp://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/Etusivu/1290609240897, http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/B-LAT1-2011.pdf

Primary Cause

Distraction due to a combination of sudden workload and difficulties in verifying the departure runway before the take-off roll.Distraction due to a combination of sudden workload and difficulties in verifying the departure runway before the take-off roll.

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