The approach, which was generally stable, was flown initially on autopilot to 900 ft and then manually with auto-thrust engaged. At 120 ft (radio) the aircraft was slightly above the glide path and the pilot pitched the aircraft down a small amount to correct the flight path. At 80 ft (radio) the power was reduced and at 50 ft (radio) progressive back stick was applied and the aircraft responded with increasing pitch. However, although the rate of descent decreased, a hard touchdown resulted from which the aircraft bounced. The pilot flying kept some back stick applied in order to cushion the landing and the aircraft continued to pitch up. The aircraft pitched down for a normal landing roll out. No formal heavy landing check was entered into the technical log. The aircraft departed for Heathrow and the operation was normal until the crew noticed a high rate of climb in the cabin attitude. The commander levelled the aircraft at FL170 and, as the cabin altitude was still climbing, a descent to FL90 was requested. The cabin altitude stabilised at 4 200 ft, and the aircraft made an uneventful landing at Heathrow. Inspection of the aircraft revealed damage consistent with a tail scrape. It was established that after the initial touchdown at Dublin, the aircraft continued to pitch up, resulting in the tail strike on the second touchdown. This was due to a combination of three effects: the pitch up effect of the automatic ground spoiler deployment, the nose-up elevator, which, although the sidestick moved forward, would still produce some nose up demand, and the pitching inertia which had developed during the landing flare.