Incident Overview
Description
An Airbus A321 operated by Thomas Cook Airlines on a charter return flight from Manchester, U.K. to Ibiza, Spain, was damaged in a hard landing accident at Manchester. The flight crew consisted of three pilots; a training captain who occupied the left flight deck seat and was the commander, a co-pilot undertaking the first two sectors of line training who occupied the right flight deck seat, and another first officer who occupied a flight deck jump seat. The flight back towards Manchester progressed normally and the commander prepared the aircraft for a flap full landing on runway 23R, adjusting the approach speed in the FMGS to ensure a five knot margin above VLS. The weather at Manchester was good with the 19:50 hrs observation indicating that the wind was 180ø/5 kt. At approximately 8 nm from touchdown, the commander handed control to the co-pilot. The co-pilot disconnected the autopilot at 1,200 ft and left the autothrust engaged. The commander watched the co-pilots sidestick inputs and recalled that he was “over-active” on the sidestick. He stated that he perceived this to be a common problem with pilots transitioning onto the Airbus aircraft. At 1,000 ft, the commander noted that the operators stable approach parameters were satisfied and stated “stable A321” in accordance with the operators SOPs. The commander gave a coaching narrative during the final moments before touchdown but, as the co-pilot closed the thrust levers, realised that the landing was “going to go wrong”. The aircraft touched down firmly and bounced. The commander stated that he considered taking control, but noted that the co-pilot appeared to be holding the aircrafts attitude and that intervention was not necessary. Although the commander believed that he made no sidestick input, FDR data showed that he did move it slightly. After the second touchdown, the landing progressed normally. The co-pilot taxied the aircraft to its parking stand and disembarkation took place. The commander and co-pilot discussed the landing and both considered it not to have been “heavy”. The commander asked some company line engineers, who had travelled back from Ibiza as passengers, for their opinions of the landing and specifically whether they thought it was a hard landing. They replied that if no “load 15 report” had been produced on the flight deck printer and the commander did not consider the landing to have been “heavy”, then in their opinion, no action needed to be taken. The commander was unfamiliar with this “load 15 report” (though he knew that the aircraft was capable of printing a report after a heavy landing), but confirmed that no report had been printed. The presence of a landing parameter exceedence report was identified after a further two sectors had been flown, when an unrelated inspection of the landing gear found a crack in a wing rib gear support lug.
Primary Cause
Pilot attentiveness and the lack of a comprehensive ‘load 15 report’ leading to a potential failure to recognize the severity of the landing.Pilot attentiveness and the lack of a comprehensive ‘load 15 report’ leading to a potential failure to recognize the severity of the landing.Share on:
