LATAM flight 2213, an Airbus A320neo, CC-BHB, sustained substantial damage when it collided with a firetruck during takeoff from runway 16 at Lima-Jorge Ch vez International Airport (LIM), Peru. There were no fatalities inside the plane, but two firefighters inside the truck sustained fatal injuries, a third firefighter sustained serious injuries. Video and ADS-B data suggests that three ARFF vehicles departed their station on the west side of the runway. The first fire truck entered the active runway 16 at taxiway B, around 1150 meters from the runway threshold. At that time flight LA2213 was accelerating for takeoff. The no.2 (right-hand) engine of the aircraft impacted the firetruck at a ground speed of around 127 kts. The right gear collapsed and a fire erupted. The aircraft slewed to a stop on the runway, about 1600 m past the point of impact, and all 102 occupants evacuated. The airport operator, Lima Airport Partners (LAP), stated that the firetrucks were part of a pre-planned response time exercise. The air traffic control agency CORPAC had confirmed the starting time of the exercise, 15:10 hours. Probable Cause: Collision of the LATAM aircraft during the takeoff run with a rescue vehicle from ARFF, which entered the runway without explicit authorization from the CORPAC control tower while conducting a response time exercise from the new aeronautical fire station at Jorge Chavez International Airport. This chain of events was caused by a lack of joint planning, poor coordination, and the failure to use standardized communication and phraseology according to ICAO regulations. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 1. Failure to conduct a post-1st ETR (Response Time Exercise) briefing meeting between Lima Airport/ARFF and CORPAC to identify errors, deficiencies, discrepancies, and material and procedural shortcomings in the exercise’s development. Such a meeting could have allowed for an analysis and implementation of improvements in all aspects, serving as a foundation for the optimal execution of the 2nd ETR. 2. CORPAC’s acceptance without comments of Lima Airport’s proposal to conduct ETRs from partially implemented and testing-phase facilities located in new airport areas that had not yet been officially handed over to CORPAC’s control. 3. The absence of meetings between Lima Airport’s SMS and CORPAC’s SMS for hazard identification, risk management, and mitigation actions inherent to the scheduling and execution of ETRs from the new airport areas and facilities. 4. Failure to hold a joint meeting between Lima Airport and CORPAC to plan the execution of the 2nd ETR, which would have provided participating personnel with a clearer understanding of the concept and details. 5. Inadequate instruction provided to ARFF and Tower Controllers’ personnel for familiarization with the location, designation, and operational functioning of the new Aircraft Taxiways and Vehicle Roadways. 6. The incorrect application of aeronautical communication principles (clarity and precision) among those involved in the prior coordination of the 2nd ETR led to a misinterpretation by CORPAC Tower Controllers regarding its execution. 7. Tower Controllers failed to realize that by authorizing ARFF to remove the Safety Cones, they were freeing up the only route (VSR4) for the direct entry of the Rescue Vehicles convoy onto the runway. 8. ARFF’s mistaken interpretation, thinking that the Tower’s confirmation for the start of the 2nd ETR also implied authorization to enter the runway. 9. Aerodrome and Surface Tower Controllers were informed about the 2nd ETR minutes before its execution, which did not allow them the capacity to properly analyze the risks and prioritize air traffic management. 10. Failure to adequately use the standardized phraseology established by ICAO for communications and exchanges between ARFF and the Tower Controller during the execution of the 2nd ETR.