Airbus G-UKLL was operated by Leisure International Airways and used to operate a holiday charter flight on behalf of Sabre Airways from Manchester to Ibiza. Flight 4064 departed at 22:30, some 15 minutes behind the planned schedule. The handling pilot for the sector was the first officer; this was decided during the pre-flight briefing, given the good meteorological conditions expected at destination. As soon as the Ibiza METAR had been obtained, while still in the cruise phase, the first officer planned for an ILS approach to runway 24, set up the navigation aids and programmed the Flight Management Guidance Computers (FMGC’s) accordingly. He pre-selected the BSCU (Brake and Steering Control Unit) Autobrake system to Low. Upon this selection, a ‘BRAKES BSCU CH 2 FAULT’ was annunciated to the crew. There was no ECAM procedure to be followed. The selection was repeated but the fault remained. The Status Page displayed ‘Inop Sys BSCU2 Fault’ (‘Inoperative System, BSCU Channel 2 Fault’). The crew checked the relevant section of the Flight Crew Operating Manual Volume 3 and this stated that the indication was for’ Crew Awareness’. No further crew action was specified. At 00:46 hrs the crew were authorised to land on runway 24, wind of 020deg at 5 knots. The aircraft made the flare and a gentle touchdown about 800 metres from the start of runway 24. A slight tailwind component was apparent, of approx. 4 kt. Reverse thrust was selected and initial deceleration appeared normal. The commander considered that more braking was required in order to slow the aircraft to achieve the planned turn off the runway, so he advised the first officer to apply more braking. The first officer tried to apply more braking but found this ineffective. He informed the commander of this and, around 80 kt, the first officer reduced reverse thrust. The commander immediately took control, reapplied reverse thrust and attempted to apply the brakes. He too found that there was no braking available. Therefore, the commander began to swerve the aircraft each way in an attempt to increase the available braking distance and slow the aircraft down by lateral skidding before reaching the end of the runway, with the tyres leaving rubber marks on the runway surface. The aircraft left the end of the runway, entering the paved stopway and then into and beyond the 60 m overrun area. The captain elected to turn the aircraft to the right to remain within the aerodrome boundary. The nose landing gear collapsed as the aircraft ran on softer and more rugged terrain to approach an earth embankment and then came to rest with both engines partially embedded in it. PROBABLE CAUSE: “The accident was caused by the lack of availability of both the Normal and the Alternate Brake systems during the landing roll. The loss of the Normal Braking system occurred as a result of a logic disagreement in both channels of BSCU caused by the acquisition of the AUTO/BRK LO input. The automatic transfer to the Alternate Braking system did not occur as a result of the BDDV failed to function because of the presence of a frozen aqueous solution in its lower cover. The deficiencies of the FCOM concerning the emergency procedures to be followed in these two failures, and the deficiencies of the flight crew training, contributed to the aircraft running out of the runway.”