Incident Overview

Date: Saturday 21 March 1992
Aircraft Type: A‚rospatiale / BAC Concorde 102
Owner/operator: British Airways
Registration Number: G-BOAB
Location: North Atlantic – ÿ Atlantic Ocean
Phase of Flight: En route
Status: Minor, repaired
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 67
Component Affected: The upper rudder.The upper rudder.
Investigating Agency: AAIBAAIB
Category: Accident
On January 1, 2007, a British Airways Concorde experienced a sudden and severe vibration during a transatlantic flight from London to New York. Initial assessment of the vibration was attributed to a brief engine surge. However, approximately one hour later, as the aircraft descended and decelerated below Mach 1.4, the vibration escalated significantly, causing portions of the upper rudder to separate. The crew was unaware of the source of the vibration but, upon investigation, the shutdown of the No. 2 engine was deemed necessary to mitigate the escalating vibration. The aircraft successfully completed a 3-engine approach and landing at JF Kennedy International Airport, New York, with a significant loss of the upper rudder. The incident highlights a potential structural failure within the upper rudder’s honeycomb structure, stemming from a combination of factors including delamination of the skid/honeycomb bond, exacerbated by an unexpected ingress of preparation materials during a major repair.On January 1, 2007, a British Airways Concorde experienced a sudden and severe vibration during a transatlantic flight from London to New York. Initial assessment of the vibration was attributed to a brief engine surge. However, approximately one hour later, as the aircraft descended and decelerated below Mach 1.4, the vibration escalated significantly, causing portions of the upper rudder to separate. The crew was unaware of the source of the vibration but, upon investigation, the shutdown of the No. 2 engine was deemed necessary to mitigate the escalating vibration. The aircraft successfully completed a 3-engine approach and landing at JF Kennedy International Airport, New York, with a significant loss of the upper rudder. The incident highlights a potential structural failure within the upper rudder’s honeycomb structure, stemming from a combination of factors including delamination of the skid/honeycomb bond, exacerbated by an unexpected ingress of preparation materials during a major repair.

Description

The British Airways Concorde, G-BOAB was on a scheduled transatlantic passenger flight from London to New York. After the aircraft had been airborne for 1 hour and 57 minutes, when cruising at FL 530 and Mach 2, the crew noticed a momentary vibration which, in the absence of any unusual indications on the flight deck instruments, they assumed to be caused by a brief engine surge. However, approximately one hour later, as the aircraft was descending and decelerating below Mach 1.4, there was a sudden onset of severe vibration that was felt throughout the aircraft. Although the crew were unaware of the source of the vibration, portions of the upper rudder were probably separating from the aircraft at this time. In attempting to diagnose the problem it was found that increasing power on No 2 engine appeared to cause the vibration level to increase and accordingly, as a precaution, this engine was shut down. Aircraft handling was apparently unaffected until during the manual landing when more than normal right rudder was needed. However, an otherwise uneventful 3-engine approach and landing was carried out at JF Kennedy International Airport, New York. Upon landing, the crew were informed that a large section of the upper rudder was missing. CAUSAL FACTORS: 1) The bonded honeycomb structure of the upper rudder, upper wedge broke-up as a result of delamination of the skid/honeycomb bond. 2) The reason for the presence of the delamination could not be established with certainty but the balance of evidence pointed to weakening of the skin/honeycomb bond, brought about by the accidental ingress of preparation materials into the core during the course of a major repair performed some 254 flying hours before the event. 3) The large size of the repair to VW23 would have made successful application of the repair procedures all the more challenging and sealing of the original structure to prevent the ingress of preparation fluids more difficult. 4) The potential for repair preparation materials to adversely affect the skidhoneycomb bond strength was not generally appreciated before this accident.

Primary Cause

Delamination of the upper rudder’s skid/honeycomb bond, exacerbated by accidental ingress of preparation materials during a major repair.Delamination of the upper rudder’s skid/honeycomb bond, exacerbated by accidental ingress of preparation materials during a major repair.

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