Incident Overview

Description
Angara Airlines flight 96 was damaged in an accident during landing on runway 30 at Ust-Kut Airport (UKX) in poor weather conditions. Low clouds and poor visibility caused the flight crew to discontinue the approach an go around. The aircraft circled for another approach. This time the approach was continued. The flight crew noticed that they were 15-20 meters to the left of the runway, so the captain made a 15ø bank to the right, but ended up overcorrecting. The aircraft was not descending left of the runway and the captain made a 30ø left bank and full rudder deflection. The flight engineer then ordered a go around and the throttles were advanced to takeoff power. The left bank then increased to 40ø and the left wing tip struck the ground to the right side of the runway. The aircraft then hit the ground with a vertical overload of about 2.6 g and travelled over the ground and onto the runway. The left-hand wing tip was severely damaged and the nose landing gear had folded. Conclusion: The aviation incident involving the aircraft An-24B RA-47848 occurred during the day, during the approach to landing in meteorological conditions below the established operational minimum of the aerodrome, and was a result of the flight crew’s decision to land in conditions that did not ensure safe approach maneuvering to eliminate lateral deviations exceeding the maximum permissible values. Disproportionate control inputs by the crew on the aircraft controls during the approach maneuver to eliminate lateral deviations led to the aircraft being brought to critical angles of attack and entering a stall condition, followed by the aircraft colliding with the ground with the left wing. Contributing factors included: – The flight crew’s decision to continue the flight to the destination aerodrome and conduct an approach to landing (instead of diverting to an alternate aerodrome from the go-around point) despite having information about meteorological conditions at the destination aerodrome below the established operational minimum of the aerodrome; – The flight crew’s failure to decide to divert to an alternate aerodrome after completing the initial go-around when the actual meteorological conditions did not meet the established operational minimum of the destination aerodrome; – Descending below the established minimum descent altitude (MDA/H); – The flight crew’s failure to take action as required by the SOPs when the ground proximity warning system alarm activated: visual “TERRAIN” warning lights and the verbal command “PULL UP”; – Lack of interaction and cross-checking between crew members, as well as inadequate crew resource management.
Source of Information
https://www.irk.ru/news/20220817/aircraft/, https://zapsib-sut.sledcom.ru/news/item/1715695/https://www.irk.ru/news/20220817/aircraft/, https://zapsib-sut.sledcom.ru/news/item/1715695/Primary Cause
The flight crew’s decision to continue the flight to the destination aerodrome and conduct an approach despite having information about meteorological conditions below the established operational minimum of the aerodrome, coupled with a failure to implement a proactive diversion strategy, directly contributed to the accident.The flight crew’s decision to continue the flight to the destination aerodrome and conduct an approach despite having information about meteorological conditions below the established operational minimum of the aerodrome, coupled with a failure to implement a proactive diversion strategy, directly contributed to the accident.Share on: