The Beechcraft B200 Super King Air was destroyed when it impacted terrain near Delhi-Indira Gandhi International Airport (DEL), India. All ten on board were killed. The aircraft was scheduled to perform a round trip from Delhi to Ranchi, India. As per the weight & load data sheet there were 8 passengers with 20 kg of baggage in the aft cabin compartment. The actual take-off weight shown was 5668.85 kg, which was just below the maximum take-off weight of 5669.9 kg Fuel uplifted was 1085 kg. The passengers were mainly technical personnel who were to carry out scheduled maintenance of a Mil Mi-17 helicopter of the Border Security Force at Ranchi. They were carrying their personnel baggage along with tools and equipment required for the maintenance. While the personal baggage was 152 kg (8 kg below the 20 kg per person used in the calculations), tools and equipment weighed at least another 63 kg. At around 09:15 hrs the flight crew contacted ATC Delhi and requested for clearance to operate the flight to Ranchi. The aircraft was cleared to Ranchi via R460 and FL210. Runway in use was given as 28. At 0918 hrs the doors were closed and the flight crew had started carrying out the check list. After the ATC issued taxi clearance, the aircraft had stopped for some time after commencing taxiing. The pilot informed the ATC that they would take 10 minutes delay for further taxi for administrative reasons. The taxi clearance was accordingly cancelled. After a halt of about 6 to 7 minutes, the pilot again requested the ATC for taxi clearance. The Tower then cleared the aircraft to taxi via E, line-up and wait on runway 28. The aircraft was then cleared for take-off. The weather at the time of take-off was: Visibility 800 meters with Winds 100 degrees at 3 knots. The speed call outs were given followed by rotate call out after the aircraft attained a speed of 110 knots at 51 seconds before the crash. Shortly after take-off and attaining a height of approximately 400 feet AGL, the aircraft progressively turned left with simultaneous loss of height. At 43 seconds before the crash, the Pilot Monitoring (PM) asked the Pilot Flying to maintain direction. At 21 seconds prior to the crash, the PM realised that the heading mode of the autopilot was not engaged, so he attempted to fly the aircraft manually. Simultaneously, at 17 seconds prior to the crash there were successive warnings of the autopilot disengage, altitude alert, bank angle alarm and stall warning alarm. At 8 seconds prior to the crash the stall warning alarm came on. The alarm continued till the end along with Bank Angle warning from the EGPWS. The aircraft had taken a turn of approximately 180ø and impacted some trees before hitting the outside perimeter road of the airport in a left bank attitude. Thereafter, it impacted head on with the outside boundary wall of the airport. After breaking the outside boundary wall, the wings impacted two trees and the aircraft hit the holding tank of the water treatment plant. The tail portion and part of the fuselage overturned and went into the water tank. There was a post impact fire and the portion of the aircraft outside the water tank was destroyed by fire. All passengers and crew received fatal injuries due impact and fire. The total PIC experience of the PF on the B200 aircraft was 77:00 hours and that of the PM was 196:35 hours as PIC. The PF was released as PIC after 620:35 hours of co-pilot experience on Type, while the PM was released as PIC after 183 hours of co-pilot experience on Type. Most of the on Type experience of these two flight crew was gained while flying amongst themselves. Despite written instructions of the Accountable Manager that an experienced pilot should be on board as the second pilot whenever the PF or PM were flying as PIC, these low experienced pilots did not fly under supervision of an experienced pilot while building their respective PIC experience. Therefore, in such a scenario there was no opportunity available to this flight crew to identify their deficiencies in flying techniques, operational procedures, correct interpretation of the effects of weather, airmanship, etc. and applicable appropriate correction/ response even though a well experienced and seasoned Senior Pilot on Type was available in-house. Also, the series of occurrences in the past 6 months prior to the crash and their non-reporting indicates lack of flying expertise and complete non-supervision of their unsafe acts. Probable Cause of the Accident: The accident was caused due to engagement of the autopilot without selecting the heading mode by the flight crew just after liftoff (before attaining sufficient height) in poor foggy conditions and not taking corrective action to control the progressive increase in left bank; thereby, allowing the aircraft to traverse 180ø turn causing the aircraft to lose height in a steep left bank attitude followed by impact with the terrain.