A Canadair Regional Jet CRJ-200ER, operated by Air Nostrum, sustained serious damage in a landing accident at Barcelona Airport (BCN), Spain. There were no serious injuries. Air Nostrum flight 8313 had departed Badajoz (BJZ) on a domestic flight to Barcelona (BCN). The copilot was Pilot Flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. They were cleared for a visual approach to runway 25R. Target speed for the approach was calculated as 138 kts. At 5 NM from the threshold, the aircraft was at an altitude of 1,844 ft, meaning it was 198 ft above the theoretical 3ø approach slope to the runway. Its IAS was 145 kts. Between miles 4.5 and 5, the aircraft descended at an angle slightly in excess of 3ø, such that its excess altitude was gradually decreasing. As stated by the crew, at around the 4.5 NM point, they encountered a cloud layer. In an effort to maintain visual conditions, the PF decided to fly above the clouds, which forced them to climb. This situation lasted until 2.8 NM, where the crew regained visual contact with the runway. By this point, the aircraft was about 725 ft above the theoretical 3ø approach slope. Its IAS was 132 kts. The crew then realized that their approach did not meet the stabilized approach criteria, meaning they had to go around. Seconds before, on the weather radar, they had noticed a storm cell. In light of this, the captain decided that the standard go-around maneuver, which consists of climbing on the runway heading (246 radial on the “BCN” VOR) to an altitude of 3,000 ft, was not viable, since it would force them into the storm cell. He also considered the possibility of going around to the right or left, but ruled out both options due to the presence of mountains to the right and of other aircraft to the left. From there to the 1 NM point, the aircraft descended at less than 1,000 ft/min, meaning that while its excess altitude decreased, the aircraft was still at an altitude of 616 ft at the end of this segment and they still had not lined up with the runway centerline. When the aircraft was at an altitude of 600 ft, the captain decided to take the controls. He deployed the speed brakes. The descent rate increased substantially, reaching an average value of 3,000 ft-min. Two seconds later, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) began issuing warnings. This continued for 13 seconds, until the aircraft reached a radio altitude of 50 ft, at which point the GPWS warnings are inhibited by design. The aircraft flew over the runway 25R threshold at an altitude of 365 ft, which translates into an excess altitude of 315 ft above the theoretical 3ø slope. Once over the runway, the speed brakes retracted, though they started deploying again 1 s later, remaining in that position until 20 s after the aircraft landed. The aircraft landed 5 s later. Only two of the three gear legs, the right main leg and the nose leg, made contact. High vertical acceleration values were recorded during this impact, with the peak value being 3.66 g’s. The aircraft bounced and became airborne again for 2 s, after which it made contact with the runway, landing hard with a maximum vertical acceleration value of 2.45 g’s. The spoilers deployed immediately. This time the aircraft did not bounce and the crew began to brake. The rest of the landing run proceeded normally. An inspection revealed structural damage. CAUSES: This accident was caused by: The execution of a destabilized approach brought about by the captain’s decision to try to descend at rates in excess of 2,500 ft/min and with the air brakes deployed from 600 ft AGL to the ground. The following contributing factors have also been identified: The presence of an adverse weather situation that was different from expected and the lack of communication between the two pilots, which caused the crew to lose situational awareness and to ignore the EGPWS warnings.