A Beechcraft A100 King Air, registration C-FGIN, operated by A‚ropro as flight 201 was making an instrument flight rules flight from Qu‚bec City Jean Lesage International Airport, QC (YQB/CYQB) to Sept-?les Airport, QC (YZV/CYZV). At 05:57, the crew started its takeoff run on runway 30; 68 seconds later, the co-pilot informed the airport controller that there was a problem with the right engine and that they would be returning to land on runway 30. Shortly thereafter, the co-pilot requested aircraft rescue and fire-fighting (ARFF) services and informed the tower that the aircraft could no longer climb. A few seconds later, the aircraft struck the ground 1.5 nautical miles from the end of runway 30. The aircraft continued its travel for 115 feet before striking a berm. The aircraft broke up and caught fire, coming to rest on its back 58 feet further on. The 2 crew members and 5 passengers died in the accident. FINDINGS AS TO CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1. After the take-off at reduced power, the aircraft performance during the initial climb was lower than that established at certification. 2. The right engine experienced a problem in flight that led to a substantial loss of thrust. 3. The right propeller was not feathered; therefore, the rate of climb was compromised by excessive drag. 4. The absence of written directives specifying which pilot was to perform which tasks may have led to errors in execution, omissions, and confusion in the cockpit. 5. Although the crew had the training required by regulation, they were not prepared to manage the emergency in a coordinated, effective manner. 6. The priority given to ATC communications indicates that the crew did not fully understand the situation and were not coordinating their tasks effectively. 7. The impact with the berm caused worse damage to the aircraft. 8. The aircraft’s upside-down position and the damage it sustained prevented the occupants from evacuating, causing them to succumb to the smoke and the rapid, intense fire. 9. The poor safety culture at A‚ropro contributed to the acceptance of unsafe practices. 10. The significant measures taken by TC did not have the expected results to ensure compliance with the regulations, and consequently unsafe practices persisted.