Some fifty minutes after takeoff from Manaus, Brazil, at an altitude of FL085, the right-hand engine failed. The propeller was feathered and the flight crew decided to divert to Coari Airport, AM (CIZ). After touching down on runway 28, the pilot lost directional control and the aircraft slid off the runway. It traveled about 200 meters until it passed through a ditch, which caused the landing gear to break. Contributing factors 1 Human factor 1.1 Medical aspect Nothing to report. 1.2 Psychological aspect a) Attitude – contributed At the individual level, there was the participation of psychological variables that directly influenced the conduct of the flight, mainly in relation to the disregard with procedures for the safe operation of the aircraft, evidenced by the overweight take-off and the non-use of the checklist during the emergency procedures. This non-compliance with the procedures was combined with the overconfidence presented by the pilot for having extensive experience in the aircraft. b) Decision making process – contributed The decision making, in this context, was random, and there was no consultation with the mechanic for the knowledge of the real conditions of the aircraft; in addition, the information available to perform a safe flight was not considered. c) Crew dynamics – contributed There was no integration of the team during the emergency procedures, which led to the omission of reading the checklist. d) Training, capacity building and training – contributed At the organizational level, the company was not equipped with an effective personnel training system, as a result of which, as noted, the crew did not have sufficient skills for emergency situations. 1.3 Operational aspect a) Command Application – contributed As the aircraft was overweight, in single-engine flight condition, it needed more speed for approach and landing. The lack of proper use of the controls made it possible to touch the runway about 700 meters after the threshold, leaving a very reduced distance for the controlled reduction of speed and total stop of the aircraft. b) Cabin Coordination – contributed The great difference in experience and qualification between the pilots prevented the co-pilot from taking a more proactive position. The crew focused their attention on the occurrence of the engine failure, not noticing the electrical breakdown, which delayed the distribution of tasks, all aggravated by not using the check list. c) Pilot forgetfulness – contributed The failure to read the check list for the emergency lowering procedure contributed to forgetting the necessary return of the selector to the normal position, which in turn contributed to the loss of control of the aircraft on the ground after landing. d) Flight Discipline – Contributed There was an intentional disobedience of the crew with respect to the operational standards established by the aircraft manufacturer (overweight). e) Infrastructure – contributed About 30m from the side of the runway, there was a depression caused by rain erosion, in which the aircraft, after leaving the runway, suffered the collapse of the landing gears. f) Instruction – contributed The crew was focusing their attention on the breakdown of engine 2 and the consequent single-engine landing. When faced with the impossibility of lowering the undercarriage through the normal system, it probably had its stress level increased. The Co-Pilot reported difficulties in locating the checklist, which ended up not being used, leading to other operational failures: not repositioning the selector switch in the “normal” position after the undercarriage was lowered by the emergency system. This fact denotes the lack of training in emergency situations. g) Trial of pilotage – contributed The crew did not adequately assess the condition of the aircraft, which operated single-engine and overweight and would lead to different speed parameters for approach and landing. (h) Maintenance of the aircraft – contributed The state of the mechanical fuel pump showed lack of maintenance and excessive use (possible exceeded limits), proven by the presence of iron oxide in the external and internal part, as well as the lack of cleaning of internal components. i) Support staff – contributed The support staff of the airline, responsible for preparing the aircraft for weight planning and balancing, allowed the operation with the weight above the expected limits. j) Flight planning – contri