After departure from Santos Dumont Airport, the CitationJet climbed to a height of 1,500 feet and maintained this altitude. The pilot crossed the line of G vea Rock and informed the Jacarepagu  tower he was following the coastal route. Shortly afterward the airplane crashed into the wooded slope of Morro da Taquara, near Alto da Boa Vista, and was totally destroyed. Both occupants were killed. Contributing Factors (translated from Portuguese language report) 1 Human Factor Medical aspect Did not contribute. Psychological aspect – Contributed The decision of the crew to continue the visual flight under adverse weather conditions and near a mountainous region was, according to the operational aspect, one of the contributing factors for the occurrence of the accident. Linked to this decision making, it is assumed that there are some other factors, among them, the excess of confidence in the equipment and familiarity with the route. These, in turn, may have favored the increased self-confidence of the pilots in their operational performances, as well as the feeling of invulnerability, leading them to a devaluation of the risk situation in which they were. Another aspect concerns the complacency among pilots, in the face of decision-making, possibly because of the degree of affinity and friendship that both had. Operational aspect a. Adverse weather conditions – Contributed Although the information in the METAR of the time did not report significant adverse conditions that would prevent VFR flight in the proposed route, that day, the entrance of a front in the TMA-RJ, that significantly altered the conditions prevailing in the area of SBJR, at the moment of the accident. In the vicinity of Pedra da G vea and Alto da Boa Vista, which are mountainous regions, conditions had deteriorated even more rapidly. Witnesses report that the ceiling was quite restricted in that locality at the time of the accident in question. b. Education – Contributed Due to the operating characteristic of the TPP aircraft, RBHA 91 does not establish the obligation to prepare a Crew Training Program, including simulator sessions, even if the aircraft are considered high performance. c. Judgment – Contributed According to the CVR records, there is an erroneous decision-making of the crew, when proceeding in visual flight under adverse weather conditions. At no point was there any initiative by the crew to return to SBRJ or modify flight rules for IFR. There is an inadequate evaluation of the distance to SBJR, which led the crew to fly to the right of the correct position of the wind leg and to an altitude below the minimum to clear the existing obstacles. d. Cockpit Coordination – Contributed Prior to take-off, a critical flight phase, which requires the crew to be attentive and comply with certain procedures, such as conducting the briefing and checking list (check list), prevailing non-activity conversations in the cabin of flight. This attitude, repeated during the other phases of the operation, revealed a complacency between the pilots in the decision making. This signals a predominance of an interpersonal relationship, friendly and relaxed, to the detriment of a professional relationship, more focused on standardization and proper execution of flight procedures. e. Planning – Contributed Although the METAR of the time did not report significant adverse weather conditions that made it impossible to fly under VFR conditions en route, it was possible to infer that a briefing was not carried out based on the analysis of the information available at that moment for the accomplishment of the mission . f. Supervision – Contributed The operating company has a solid tradition in the market and certainly presents a well developed safety culture in the field of road transport. However, there is a lack of experience in the aeronautical field. Due to this, it is assumed that the culture of flight, little developed, has facilitated the existence of behaviors and procedures incompatible with flight safety. Regarding the process of supervision of the pilots, there was no basis on the part of the company to charge its pilots for compliance with norms that regulate air activity. In view of the above, it is believed that the Organization, due to the almost non-existent aeronautical culture and the fragile culture of flight safety, allowed the predominance of decisions taken from individual visions (of the crew), instead of those based