The aircraft started the takeoff roll on runway 33 at Lima (LIM). When reaching VR speed (207 km/h) the copilot announced “rotation” and the captain raised the nose of the airplane. At V2 (242 km/h) it reached a positive climb and the undercarriage was raised. From a height of 5 m the airplane began to descend again. It contacted the runway with the tail and skidded for about 200 meters before coming to rest. It appears that an overweight takeoff was carried out with flaps at 0 degrees instead of 15 degrees. CONCLUSIONS: “The Aviation Accident Investigation Commission of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, determines on the probable cause(s) of the accident, as follows: The impact of the aircraft against the ground without loss of control due to the deficient dispatch, planning, execution of the Checklists and CRM of the crew allowing the takeoff and rotation run to start with overweight (25,798kgs) and 0ø of flap since for a weight of 25,000kgs corresponded 15 ø of flaps according to the Flight Manual of the aircraft. Likewise, the failure to abort the takeoff when the configuration alarm did not function. CONTRIBUTING CAUSES: – The overweight of the aircraft, which was due to the deficient procedure used by the same crew member who performed the functions of dispatcher and navigator in Lima, by not complying with the provisions of the ATSA company’s MGO. – The Checklists that do not conform to the order indicated in the Flight Manual (Annex 3) of the aircraft.”