On the morning of April 20, 2004 Alitalia MD-82 I-DAWR departed Brindisi (BDS) for a direct flight to Rome-Fiumicino (FCO). The next flight was to Trieste (TRS); the copilot was the pilot flying on this leg. The airplane departed at 08:47. The MD-82 landed at Trieste’s runway 09 after an uneventful flight. The crew were cleared to taxi to the ramp and took taxiway Bravo, which was the first taxiway to the right. With the sun in front the view of the crew was bit hampered. At the last moment the captain noticed a vehicle to his right hand side. He steered to the left to avoid it, but the truck impacted the right wing. The outer part of the wing (3,5 m/ca. 11 feet) was almost completely sheared off. The fuel tank ruptured, causing a fuel spill on the taxiway. After noticing the spill, the crew ordered an emergency evacuation of the airplane. The evacuation was initiated one minute and 20 seconds after the collision. One minute and 24 seconds later, the fire brigade had reached the scene. It appeared that construction works were in progress near taxiway Bravo. A Notam was not issued about this and the tower controller had not informed the crew either. CAUSES (translated from Italian): The analysis of the technical, operational and organizational context in which the event took place (impact of the end of the right wing of the aircraft, during taxiing, against the rear body of a truck that was parked for work within the protection area of the taxiway that leads from the BRAVO connection to the parking area) has allowed to determine the following causes, which are attributable to human and environmental factors. – Failure to close the BRAVO taxiway with the issue of the relative NOTAM of the works in progress. – Failure of the Torre control to provide the pilots with essential information on the condition of the airport, as provided for by ICAO in ICAO Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM. – Vertical and horizontal ground signs do not correspond to those specified in ICAO Annex 14. – Failure to comply with the ENAC circular (APT-11), applicable for the type of work in progress at the airport. – Insufficient surveillance of the airport area affected by the works by ENAC and the airport management company Aeroporto FVG. – Lack of an airport Safety Management System . – Inadequate surveillance of the external space during taxiing by the flight crew, resulting in incorrect assessment of the position of the aircraft with respect to the obstacle.