Incident Overview

Date: Monday 14 December 1998
Aircraft Type: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-87 (MD-87)
Owner/operator: SAS Scandinavian Airlines System
Registration Number: SE-DMA
Location: Mnchen-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM) – ÿ Germany
Phase of Flight: Approach
Casualties: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 34
Component Affected: Autopilot SystemAutopilot System
Category: Accident
During initial approach, an aircraft experienced a rapid airspeed increase exceeding the maximum allowed, leading to a nose-up trim change. The autopilot disconnected unexpectedly, resulting in a sharp nose-up movement and subsequent nose-down drift. G-load variations were significant, and a cabin crew member sustained serious injuries. The incident is likely attributable to a disconnect in the autopilot system triggered by the pilot’s control input.During initial approach, an aircraft experienced a rapid airspeed increase exceeding the maximum allowed, leading to a nose-up trim change. The autopilot disconnected unexpectedly, resulting in a sharp nose-up movement and subsequent nose-down drift. G-load variations were significant, and a cabin crew member sustained serious injuries. The incident is likely attributable to a disconnect in the autopilot system triggered by the pilot’s control input.

Description

During initial approach to the crew got clearance to increase speed. The cabin crew was carrying out the safety checks and the passengers were all seated and the “Fasten seat belt” signs were on. The aircraft was on autopilot in the Vertical Speed mode, with the engines at flight idle. When descending through FL090 the airspeed increased beyond 330 KIAS and approached the maximum allowed of 340 KIAS. On observing this the copilot, who was PF (Pilot Flying), initiated a nose-up trim change with the Pitch Control Wheel in order to reduce speed. As he did not notice an immediate effect of the trimming he pulled back on the control wheel. The autopilot disconnected at this point, either manually by the pilot or automatically by the system – it has not been possible to establish which. At disconnect there was a sharp nose-up movement, followed by a nose-down movement. The G-load varied from 2.77 to 0.04 G. One cabin crew member suffered serious injuries. The probable cause was that the autopilot disconnect came after the pilot’s control input.

Primary Cause

Autopilot disconnect triggered by pilot control input.Autopilot disconnect triggered by pilot control input.

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